

Mr. Colman:pgk

MEMORANDUM

To: The Commission and Lee (J.) Rankin

From: Coleman and Slawson

Subject: Oswald's Foreign Activities: Summary of Evidence which might be said to show that there was Foreign Involvement in the Assassination of President Kennedy

I. Introduction

One of the basic purposes of the Commission's investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy is to determine whether such assassination was due in whole or in part to any foreign conspiracy.

The foreign countries most readily suspected in the public's mind would be the Soviet Union and Cuba. The Chinese communists and Madame Nhu's wing of Vietnam, however, might also be suggested.

The investigation conducted by the section of the staff responsible for the foreign aspect part of the Commission's work leads to the conclusions that there was no foreign conspiracy. But there is evidence which might lead to the ^{inference} ~~influence~~ of foreign involvement which we think should be brought specifically to the attention of the Commission.

1/ Madame Nhu reportedly sent Mrs. Kennedy a very inconsiderate telegram shortly after the assassination and she has been reported in the public press as stating that the assassination of President Kennedy was public retribution for the killing of her husband which she claimed was only American inspired.

Members for their independent evaluation.

Direct and explicit evidence of a foreign conspiracy obviously would be hard to come by since there would be the greatest attempt by the country involved to prevent discovery. In addition, such investigation is dependent largely upon information secured from the foreign government involved which obviously would not be cooperative if it was in any way involved.

We think this separate memorandum for the Commission Members and the General Counsel appropriate since when we begin to draft the report the emphasis probably will be somewhat different since there the thrust will be to demonstrate the negative. And some of the information contained herein, moreover, is Top Secret and therefore could not be disclosed to the American Public at this time, not because of the information but because it is necessary to protect the method or source of obtaining the information. In other words in the final report we can set forth the facts of the information but not the source to show their accuracy.

II. Involvement by the Soviet Union

The evidence which might be used by an investigator, critic or historian to support a contention that the Soviet Union was involved in the assassination includes the following:

1. The circumstances surrounding Oswald's entry into the Soviet Union in October 1959: Do they show that the Russians knew of his coming or that he received special treatment?

While still in the United States Marine Corps, Oswald on September 4, 1949, applied for a U.S. passport to travel abroad, which passport was issued on September 10, 1959. Oswald listed as the countries which he intended to visit, Cuba, Dominican Republic, England, France, Switzerland, Germany, Finland and Russia. He also stated on the application that the purpose of his trip would be to attend the Albert Schweitzer College in Churivalden, Switzerland.

We are not quite certain when Oswald first determined to go to Russia.^{2/} He had been stationed abroad in 1957 and 1958, including the Philippines, Japan and Formosa. Thus there is the possibility that

^{2/} There is a statement attributed to Oswald's mother's doctor, Dr. Morton N. Goldberg, that the mother told him sometime between April 4, 1957, and January 30, 1959, that her son (unnamed) intended to defect to Russia. (CIA Chronology, 1957-1959)

Oswald came into contact with Communist agents at that time. While in the Marine Corps he did engage in arguments with other Marines in favor of Marxism and Socialism. And while in the Marine Corps he managed to save \$1,600 despite the fact that he never earned more than \$100 per month.

While in Atsugi, Japan, he studied the Russian language. By the time he reached Russia he could speak it well enough to get along ⁱⁿ with restaurants and by May 1961, when he met Marina he spoke Russian well enough that she at first thought he was from Russia but not one of the main cities.

By early spring in 1959, Oswald had planned to leave the United States. He wrote a letter to his brother which, inter alia, stated:

"Well, pretty soon I will be getting out of the Corps and I know what I want to be and how I'm going to do it."

On March 14, 1959, Oswald applied for admission to the Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland (Comm. 818). He was accepted and was

supposed to start the course on April 19, 1960, but he never attended.

He left New Orleans, La., for Europe on Sept. 19, 1959, having been honorably discharged from the Marine Corps on September 11, 1959.

Instead of going to Switzerland, he went directly to Helsinki, Finland, by way of LeHavre, France, and London, England, arriving at Helsinki on October 10, 1959. (The stops in LeHavre and London, England were only for several hours though when he reached London he told the immigration officials he intended to stay for 7 days).

Four days later,^{3/} on October 14, 1959, he applied at the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki for a Soviet visa and was issued Soviet Tourist Visa No. 403339, valid for entry at the Viborg-Moscow border point, until October 20, 1959, for a 6-day sojourn in the Soviet Union from the time he crossed the border with exit at the same point. Oswald entered the Soviet Union at the Vainikkain crossing point en route to Moscow by train on October 15, 1959. He arrived in Moscow, Russia, on October 16, 1959, and at that point he was met by an Intourist

^{3/} Oswald reached Helsinki on October 10, 1959, so there is a possibility that Oswald applied for the visa on October 10, 1959. The October 14, 1959, date is one supplied McVickar by Oswald.



Representative, Rima Shirokova, taken to the Hotel Berlin, where he showed his 6-day tourist visa and registered as a student.

There have been statements to the effect that Oswald's entry into Russia raises suspicion because of the ease with which it happened. For example, John A. McVickar, an official at the Embassy in Moscow in November 1959, stated in a memorandum of November 27, 1963, that there was a possibility that in coming to the Soviet Union and attempting to renounce his citizenship Oswald was "following a pattern of behavior in which he had been tutored by person or persons unknown." Comm. Doc. No. 843, p. 3. McVickar also states that significance should be given to the fact that Oswald selected Helsinki, Finland, since Oswald would have to have know the not too obvious fact that Helsinki is a "usual and relatively uncomplicated point of entry to the Soviet Union (one that the Soviets might well choose for example if arranging the passage themselves)."

Part of McVickar's suspicion was due to his assumption that Oswald had been issued a "regular visa" and not a "tourist" visa as

was actually the case. But it should be noted that Oswald applied

for the visa on October 14, 1959, and received it on October 16, 1959,^{3/}

two days later. The Legal Adviser to the Department of State in a

letter dated April 24, 1964, has stated:

"It appears, therefore, that he received the visa within a day or two. Usually it takes at least a week for Soviet authorities to process tourist applications, and so the speed with which Oswald received his tourist visa was unusual."

2. Soviet action in permitting Oswald to remain in Russia

and giving him employment.

On the same day (October 16, 1959) that Oswald reached Moscow he informed the Intourist guide, Rina Shirokova, that he wished to apply for Soviet citizenship. On that day or the next day with the help of his guide, Oswald prepared a letter to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. requesting citizenship. Oswald was never granted Soviet citizenship but instead given an "Identity Document for Stateless Persons"

(Vid na Zhitelstvo v SSSR dlya lits bez grazhdanstva) Number 311479.

This document apparently had to be renewed each year. Oswald was told that he could stay in the Soviet Union on January 4, 1960^{3a/}, and was issued the stateless person passport. He was told he was being sent to Minsk.

In the meanwhile, on October 31, 1959, however, Oswald appeared at the American Embassy and saw Richard E. Snyder who was then Second Secretary. He threw his passport on Snyder's desk stating that he wanted to renounce his American citizenship. Oswald informed Snyder that he had been a radar operator in the Marine Corps and that he voluntarily stated to an unnamed Soviet official that as an American citizen he would make known to them such information concerning the Marine Corps and his specialty as he possessed. He intimated that he might know something of special interest.

Oswald was told that he would have to file a formal renunciation. This he never did although in a letter dated November 3, 1959, which he wrote to the Embassy he stated:

^{3a/} Earlier on November 16, 1959, he had been informed he could remain in U.S.S.R. until a decision had been reached on his case.

I, Lee Harvey Oswald, do hereby request that my present United States citizenship be revoked.

I appeared in person, at the consulate office of the United States Embassy, Moscow, on Oct. 31st, for the purpose of signing the formal papers to this effect. This legal right I was refused at that time.

I wish to protest against this action, and against the conduct of the official of the United States consular service who acted on behalf of the United States Government.

My application, requesting that I be considered for citizenship in the Soviet Union is now pending before the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. In the event of acceptance, I will request my government to lodge a formal protest regarding this incident.

The record shows that except for the visit to the Embassy on October 31, 1959, Oswald made a studied attempt to make sure that he did not lose his United States citizenship. In fact, in November 1961 he was writing letters to the Embassy making inquiries whether by accepting a Stateless Person Document for another year would that in any way affect his American citizenship.

On November 27, 1963, John A. McVickar, a Foreign Service Officer, wrote a memorandum to Thomas Erhlich, in which he described the original meeting with Oswald. McVickar was one of the two secretaries in the Embassy, in October 1959, the other one being Richard C. Snyder

with whom Oswald had the October 31, 1959 conversation. McVicker

also was present in the room during Snyder's interview with Oswald.

He confirms what Snyder said about the interview. He states in

addition that Oswald talked in such a way that there was "a possibility

that he was following a pattern of behavior in which he had been tutored

by person or persons unknown. For example, in discussing Marxism

and the legalities of renunciation, he seemed to be using words which

he had learned but did not fully understand. His determined statements

in rather long words were not entirely consistent and not in a fully

logical sequence ... in short, it seemed to me that there was a

possibility that he had been in contact with others before or during

his Marine Corps tour who had guided him and encouraged him in his

actions."^{4/} Also, the Soviet permit issued to Oswald was good for

one year and was extended at Oswald's request until January 4, 1962.

The fact that he did not go through with the renunciation

together with the fact that the Soviet Union would give him only a

^{4/} See Memo of J. McVicker, Nov 27, '63 attached as Exhibit 14a
(File 294g)

Stateless Person Document is subject to the argument that there is the inference that Oswald and the Soviet Union planned that someday Oswald would return to the United States.

The evidence which tends to contradict this inference includes:

A. Oswald's Historical Diary, assumedly valid and contemporaneously written, shows that between October 16, 1959, and January 4, 1960, he was kept on tenterhooks so far as being given permission to stay in the Soviet Union permanently. It also shows that he was not given much encouragement by the Soviet official and at one point he was so despondent he attempted to commit suicide after being told that he would have to leave Russia within forty-eight hours. The medical records support the fact there was a scar on one of Oswald's wrists. Marina states, however, that Oswald never mentioned an attempt at suicide.

B. On November 26, 1963, Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., of the Embassy in Moscow reported a conversation that he had had with a higher Russian official as follows:

"As a sidelight, I might mention that when I saw Kudryavtsev of the American Section of the MFA at the airport Saturday night when we saw Mikoyan off, he referred to Oswald and said that he seemed to be an unstable character. On his own initiative, Kudryavtsev mentioned that Oswald had been in the Soviet Union, had married a Soviet girl and a child had been born in the Soviet Union of this marriage. Kudryavtsev said that Oswald had applied for Soviet citizenship but that, after considering the application, the Soviet authorities had decided not to approve this application since Oswald seemed to be so unstable. They had, however, permitted him to reside in the USSR for a certain period and then had permitted him and his family to leave."

C. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on December 11, 1963, gave

the following oral statement which purports to set forth the Soviet

Government's reply to Secretary of State Rusk's inquiry as to why

the Soviet Union refused Oswald's application for citizenship:

"The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. and Soviet legislation provide that Soviet citizens have certain rights and appropriate responsibilities. Considering an application for Soviet citizenship the competent authorities of the Soviet Union take into account first of all the ability of the applicant to carry out responsibilities of a citizen of the U.S.S.R. and to make use of the rights granted to him. Due regard is paid also the motivations of one's application for admission to Soviet citizenship.

"The competent Soviet authorities that considered Oswald's application did not find convincing grounds which would allow to draw a conclusion that he complied with the requirements provided for Soviet citizens in the Constitution and legislations of the U.S.S.R.

"The motives which made Oswald file his application were also not clear. The fact that Oswald made critical remarks about the State the citizen of which he was, could not, of course, be decisive in considering his application.

"In view of the above-mentioned considerations Oswald's application for Soviet citizenship was rejected."

D. The most recent Soviet defector, Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, has stated to the FBI that when Oswald arrived as a tourist in the Soviet Union the KGB had no "current interest" in Oswald and possessed no information that Oswald was a member of the Communist Party, U.S.A., or elsewhere. He also indicated that Oswald was discouraged from remaining permanently in Russia. He said, "Oswald was not regarded by the KGB as being completely normal mentally nor was he considered to be very intelligent." The CIA has not yet given us an evaluation on the reliability of Nosenko but they indicated that they ought to be able to give us the evaluation by the middle of May. As developed elsewhere in this memo the authenticity of Nosenko is of high importance. Nosenko states that he was the person in charge of the Oswald investigation immediately after the news of the assassination of President Kennedy and the information, he gives, if completely true goes a long way towards showing no Soviet involvement. On the other hand, if not true, serious questions are raised.

E. We requested the CIA to advise us on whether it felt the treatment of Oswald was exceptional or unusual with respect to permission to remain in the Soviet Union. In a memorandum dated April 6, 1964, the CIA informed us that it saw nothing unusual or exceptional (Comm. No. 708). Other defectors were treated in about the same manner (p. 2).

3. Money paid, and treatment given to Oswald while he was in the Soviet Union.

As stated above, Oswald was informed on January 4, 1960, that he could remain in the Soviet Union. Oswald states that he was given 5000 rubles and sent to Minsk where he was employed in an electronics factory. The name of the factory is Belo Russian Radio and Television Factory. He also states that he would receive a salary of 700 rubles per month and that he would be given an extra 700 rubles per month.

The 5000 rubles^{5/} and the 700 rubles per month were to be paid by the "Red Cross." This reference is quite significant since Oswald states in his Diary that in Russia the "Red Cross" is a euphemism for the KGB.

^{5/} Out of the 5000 rubles he paid his hotel bill of 2,200 rubles and purchased a train ticket to Minsk for 150 rubles.

The reference is also important because the letter which Marina claims Oswald left her at the time of the General Walker shooting contains a statement that "we have friends here (i.e. interpreted States). The Red Cross will also help you (Red Cross in English)."

(FBI Exhibit 32)

Suspicion is raised by the fact that Oswald received these considerable payments, particularly when the record shows that he made no statements in denouncing the U.S. after the time he attempted to renounce his American citizenship. Additional suspicion might be gleaned from the fact that Marina who was better trained received less than 700 rubles for working as a pharmacist, and Marina has stated that medical doctors in the Soviet Union received less than 700 rubles per month. When Oswald got to Minsk he was assigned to the Minsk Radio Factory, a major producer of electronic parts and sets, employing 5000 persons. His work book indicates that he was assigned to the "experimental shop" as a "adjuster, first class." In his Diary he indicates that he was working as "checker" metal worker.

6/ During an interview with an FBI representative on June 26, 1962, Oswald stated that in Minsk he was given a job as a metal worker in a TV factory. He stated that he spent his time reading blueprints and translating blueprint instructions into the finished product. (over)

When Oswald arrived in Minsk he was met, according to him, by two women from the local "Red Cross." He says he was also met the next day by the "city mayor" and he was promised a rent-free apartment.

During his stay in Minsk, Oswald lived in a very nice apartment, in an attractive part of Minsk and apparently had sufficient resources to be able to enjoy good living in Minsk.

4. Oswald's activities with the gun club in Minsk.

Oswald's writings (and later after he returned to United States) and Marina's testimony contain references to Oswald being away from his Minsk home occasionally for hunting trips or meetings with the "Minsk Gun Club." Found among his effects was his membership card in the Gun Club and also a permit to possess a shotgun. Marina has testified that she only remembers his going hunting on one occasion though he did have the permit fully a year before she married him. Nosenko has stated that Oswald's membership in the Minsk Gun Club is reported in the KGB records and there is also the statement that he was a poor shot.

If Russian Intelligence was training Oswald without Marina's knowledge attendance at Gun Club meetings and hunting trips would be a logical cover.

5. His relationship with Marina.

Oswald met Marina on March 18, 1961, and married her six weeks later. A year earlier Oswald had already expressed dissatisfaction with Russian life. Marina was well educated and the uncle with whom she lived was a Major or Colonel in the Soviet Army. She had come to Minsk from Leningrad only a short time before she met Oswald and she admits dating someone else until the night before her engagement to Oswald. When Marina and Oswald were attempting to leave the Soviet Union she was granted an interview at the MVD in Minsk for the purpose of expediting her exit permit. She thinks the person she saw was a high MVD official, Colonel Nikola (pnu) ASENOV, and she believed that the interview was granted because she was the niece of MVD Colonel Ilya Prusakov.

It seems very clear that her uncle lived well by Soviet standards having a desirable apartment and a telephone.



On April 20, 1961, Marina and Oswald decided to get married.

They went to the registry to file a declaration of intent to marry

and were told it took 7 days to obtain permission to marry a

foreigner. The permission was granted within 7 days. There are

instances where other Russians attempt to marry an American and the

time taken to secure permission is often months.

6. The ease with which Marina and Oswald were able to obtain permission to leave the Soviet Union.

On February 1, 1961, Oswald wrote his first letter to the United States Embassy in Moscow indicating that he wished to return to the United States. ^{7/} Marina applied for an exit permit in May 1961.

(Chronology, Commission, p. 140) She received the necessary Soviet permission on December 25, 1961. Marina was summoned to the Soviet Passport Office and informed that exit visas for herself and her husband had been granted, the exit visas being valid until December 1, 1962.

^{7/} This letter was received at the Embassy on February 13, 1961. Earlier on February 1, 1961, the State Department had sent an inquiry to the Moscow Embassy requesting the Embassy to inform Oswald that his mother had made inquiries concerning his whereabouts. The coincidence of the Feb. 1, 1961 State Department inquiry and the Oswald letter suggests that perhaps the Russians had knowledge of the State Department request. We have been informed, however, that the ~~first~~ request went by diplomatic pouch and thus the Russians had no opportunity to intercept.

Moreover, Oswald was permitted to travel from Minsk to Moscow to visit the United States Embassy in July 1961. Apparently he had no problem although we have been informed by the CIA that travel was not freely permitted between Minsk and Moscow at this time. Also Marina was able to travel to Moscow and go into the American Embassy on July 10, 1961, without any difficulty. Marina states that when she came to Moscow she and Lee were able to stay at the Hotel Berlin despite the fact that the hotels were crowded. She said that this was because Oswald was known at Hotel Berlin.

As far as the Soviet Union was concerned, Oswald and Marina were free to leave any time after December 25, 1961. Actually they didn't leave until May 31, 1962 but this was because of delays caused by the U. S. in determining whether a passport should be issued to Oswald and whether Marina was eligible for entry into the United States, and the birth of the child.

7. Oswald-Marina's contact with the Soviet Embassy in

Washington after their return to the United States.

Soon after the Oswalds reached the United States they got in contact with the Soviet Embassy in Washington. This contact was caused by the requirement that Soviet citizens living in the United States contact the Embassy and file with it certain forms. The contact was continued when Marina and Oswald attempted to return to the Soviet Union, the first request being made on February 17, 1963^{8/} (Commission Chronology, p. 468). She was informed on March 8, 1963 that it would take from 5 to 6 months to process the application.

The Soviet Union has made available to us what purports to be all of the communications between the Oswalds and the Russian Embassy in the United States. This material has been checked for codes and none has been found. Except for the last letter which Oswald wrote to the Soviet Embassy which will be discussed below, there is no material which gives any reason for suspicion or doubt. However, on April 13, 1963, the Soviet Union did request her to

^{8/} The first letter stated that she wished to return, but her husband would stay, as "He is an American by nationality."

to visit the Embassy in Washington and also asked her for the reason for wanting to return to the Soviet Union. It is arguable that this request was strange since she was a Soviet citizen and her passport was limited in time.

8. The information supplied by Nosenko.

In February 1961, Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, a relatively high Soviet official, asked for asylum in the United States. His position with the Soviet Union was as a high official with KGB and he was attending a conference in Geneva at the time of his escape. In the course of interrogation by the FBI and the CIA, it turns out that he had knowledge with respect to Oswald. He says that when Oswald arrived in the Soviet Union in 1959, he, Nosenko, was Deputy Chief, First Section, Seventh Department, Second Chief Directorate (counterintelligence) KGB (Committee for State Security). He said that the information that Oswald wanted to apply for Soviet citizenship was reported to him and the report prepared by the Intourist guide concerning conversations with Oswald and "his"^{2/} impressions and evaluations of Oswald were passed

^{2/} Actually the Intourist guide was female.

upon by Nosenko. At the time a file was opened on Oswald incorporating all the information which had been collected. He also said that he knew about Oswald's suicide attempt. The hospital records were evaluated which showed mental instability on the part of Oswald.

He said that it was not a KGB decision that Oswald be permitted to remain in Russia. He also stated that the KGB had instructed that Oswald not be permitted to reside in the Moscow area. He said that he had nothing to do with the decision that Oswald be sent to Minsk. However, after the KGB was advised of the decision that Oswald be permitted to reside in Minsk, Oswald's file was sent to the KGB office in Minsk, the covering letter briefly summarized Oswald's case and specifically instructed that KGB Minsk take no action concerning Oswald except to "passively" observe his activities to make sure that he was not a United States intelligent agent temporarily dormant. This letter was read and approved by Nosenko but signed by someone else.

He also states that he next heard of Oswald in connection with Oswald's application to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in October 1963 for a Soviet re-entry visa. He said that when Nosenko's department was informed that Oswald was attempting to return to the Soviet Union, he stated that he had no interest in Oswald and that the Department recommended that Oswald's request for re-entry visa be denied. Nosenko states that the next knowledge of Oswald's activity came to his attention as a result of the assassination of President Kennedy. Within four hours after the assassination Nosenko was advised that Oswald had been arrested and Nosenko and his staff were called to work for the purpose of determining whether the KGB had any information concerning Oswald. When Oswald's identity was established from the KGB files, the Chief of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB, Gribanov, telephone the KGB office in Minsk and had them dictate a summary of the Oswald file. The summary concluded with a statement that the KGB at Minsk "had endeavored to influence Oswald in the right direction."

This statement greatly disturbed Gribanov and he ordered that all records at Minsk pertaining to Oswald be forwarded immediately to Moscow by military aircraft with an explanation of the meaning of the above-mentioned statement.

When the file reached Moscow, Nosenko stated that it contained no information to indicate that the KGB at Minsk had taken any action with respect to Oswald contrary to the original instructions that he only be observed "passively." The file did indicate Oswald's marriage to Marina, with background data on Marina, including the fact she had been a member of the Comsomol (Communist Party Youth Organization) but was dropped for nonpayment of dues.

Nosenko said that he was absolutely certain that Oswald received no training dealing with sabotage, explosions, killings, terror, etc., and that KGB did not use Oswald since he appeared to be mentally unstable. Nosenko did advise that the KGB file showed that the Soviet Red Cross had made payments to Oswald and that Oswald had access to a gun which he used to hunt game with fellow employees in the Soviet Union. The file showed that Oswald was an extremely poor shot.

The above summary of the statements of Nosenko, if true, certainly would go a long way towards showing that the Soviet Union had no part in the assassination. On the other hand, one has to be struck by the rare coincidence between the investigation of this Commission and the fact that the Soviet official who defects is one with such primary knowledge about Oswald. If the CIA states that Nosenko is telling the truth and is valid and legitimate, this information should go a long way towards satisfying the Commission with respect to the lack of Soviet involvement. On the other hand, if doubts exist with respect to the authenticity and sincerity of Nosenko, then we have the vexing question of why the Soviet Union took this tactic to place the Nosenko information in the hands of the United States.

9. Oswald's letter to the Soviet Embassy after his return from Mexico.

As stated below Oswald was in Mexico from September 26, 1963 until October 3, 1963, and while in Mexico City had several visits

with the Cuban and Soviet Embassies. The outward purpose of the trip was an attempt to return to the Soviet Union by way of Cuba.

After the assassination the Soviet Embassy in Washington turned over certain documents to the United States (FBI Ex 57) including the following letter from Oswald to Consular Division, Embassy, U.S.S.R., Washington, D.C., dated November 9, 1963:

"This is to inform you of recent events----- meetings with comrade Kostin (preceding words not legible) in the Embassy of the Soviet Union, Mexico City, Mexico.

"I was unable to remain in Mexico indefinitely because of my Mexican visa restrictions which was for 15 days only. I could not take a chance on requesting a new visa unless I used my real name, so I returned to the United States.

"I had not planned to contact the Soviet embassy in Mexico so they were unprepared, had I been able to reach the Soviet Embassy in Havana as planned, the embassy there would have had time to complete our business.

"Of course the Soviet embassy was not at fault, they were, as I say unprepared, the Cuban consulate was guilty of a gross breach of regulations, I am glad he has since been replaced."

bears
The envelope ~~has~~/a postdate of November 12, apparently.

Marina has testified that Oswald made many drafts of the letter before it was ~~finally~~ sent and at least one draft ~~was~~ found among Oswald's papers.

We have determined that the Cuban Consulate was replaced.

Someone might ask how Oswald would know about such replacement so soon after the event. The CIA has informed us that the plan to replace the Cuban Consulate had been made before Oswald reached Mexico City and he might have picked up the knowledge at that time.

III. Cuban Involvement

The suspicion of Cuban involvement is based upon two factors, one, Oswald's identification with the Fair Play for Cuba, and two, Oswald's trip to Mexico. From all of the information we have with respect to the Fair Play for Cuba, it looks as though it was pretty much of a one-man show and there was no direct or indirect contact with the Cuban Government.

The Mexican trip causes more difficulty. Through security arrangements we have seen written summaries of transcripts of certain conversations between the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico while Oswald was in Mexico as well as conversations between the President of Cuba and the Cuban Ambassador in Mexico, soon ~~HE~~ after the assassination.

Oswald reached Mexico City at approximately 10:00 a.m. on September 27, 1963. Shortly thereafter he called the Soviet Embassy

in Mexico City and the following conversation took place:

OSWALD: May I speak to the Consul?
INSIDE VOICE: He is not in.
OSWALD: I need some visas in order to go to Odessa.
INSIDE VOICE: Please call at 11:30.
OSWALD: Until when?
INSIDE VOICE: (Hangs up)

At 4:05 p.m. on the same day Silvia Duran, a known Mexican Communist, who was an employee of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City called from the Cuban Consulate to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

The conversation was as follows:

SILVIA DURAN: There is an American here who has requested and in-transit visa because he is going to Russia. I would like to know whom he spoke to at the Russian Embassy, because I sent him to you thinking if he got a Russian visa that I could then issue him a Cuban visa without any more processing. Who did he speak to? He claims he was told there were no more problems.

INSIDE VOICE: Wait a minute. (The inside voice then explains to someone else on his side of the line that Silvia Duran is calling, that she is calling in reference to an American who says he had previously been to the Soviet Embassy, etc.)

ANOTHER INSIDE VOICE: Please leave the name and number and we will call you back.

SILVIA DURAN: (She leaves her name and her telephone number and then she engages in some personal conversation in regards to the fact that she has recently changed apartments and therefore would like the "bulletin" sent to her new address. The voice in the Soviet Embassy agrees.)

Twenty minutes later someone in the Soviet Embassy telephoned the Cuban Embassy as follows:

VOICE FROM THE SOVIET EMBASSY: What's the number of the Cuban Consul?

VOICE AT THE CUBAN EMBASSY: Its 11-28-47.

A minute later a call is placed by the Soviet Embassy to the Cuban Embassy. The substance of the call is as follows:

RUSSIAN EMBASSY: Has the American been there?

SILVIA DURAN: Yes, he is here now.

RUSSIAN EMBASSY: According to the letter that he showed from the Consulate in Washington, he wants to go to Russia to stay for a long time with his wife who is Russian. But we have received no answer from Washington, and it will probably take four to five months. We cannot give a visa here without asking Washington. He says he belongs to a pro-Cuban organization and the Cubans cannot give him a visa without his first getting a Russian visa. I do not know what to do with him. I have to wait for an answer from Washington.

SILVIA DURAN: We have to wait too, because he knows no one in Cuba and therefore it's difficult to give him a visa. He says he knew it would take a long time to process the Soviet visa but hoped to await that in Cuba.

RUSSIAN EMBASSY: "The thing is that if his wife is now in Washington she will receive the visa for return to Russia. She will receive it and then can send it any place but right now she does not have it."

OSWALD: "I was in your Embassy and spoke to your Consul."

RUSSIAN EMBASSY: "What else do you want?"

OSWALD: "I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address."

RUSSIAN EMBASSY: "I know that."

OSWALD: "I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it."

RUSSIAN EMBASSY: Why don't you come by and leave it then, we're not far.

OSWALD: "Well, I'll be there right away."

On October 1, 1963, at 10:30 a.m. Oswald speaking in broken

Russian telephones the Soviet Embassy, the conversation being as

follows:

OSWALD: "Hello. I was at your place last Saturday and talked to your Consul. They said they'd send a telegram to Washington, and I wanted to ask you, is there anything new?"

RUSSIAN EMBASSY: Call another telephone number, if you will.

OSWALD: Please.

RUSSIAN EMBASSY: 15-60-55, and ask for a Consul.

OSWALD: THANK YOU.

RUSSIAN EMBASSY: "Please."

Oswald called back an hour later and the conversation was

as follows:

OSWALD: Hello, this is Lee Oswald. I was at your place last Saturday and talked to your Consul. They said they'd send a telegram to Washington, and I wanted to ask you whether there was anything new, but I cannot remember the name of the Consul.

OBYEDKOV: "Kostikov. He is dark?"

OSWALD: "Yes. My name is Oswald."

OBYEDKOV: "Just a minute. I'll find out. They say they have not received anything yet."

SILVIA DURAN: "Naturally, and we can't give him a visa here because we do not know if his Russian visa will be approved."

RUSSIAN EMBASSY: "We can issue a visa only according to instructions."

SILVIA DURAN: "That is what I will put in my plans."

RUSSIAN EMBASSY: "We can't give him a letter of recommendation either, because we do not know him. Please pardon the bother."

SILVIA DURAN: "No bother. Thank you very much."

On September 28 at 11:51 a.m. Silvia Duran telephone the Russian Consulate. The substance of the call was as follows:

SILVIA DURAN: There is an American here who says he has been to the Russian Consulate.

RUSSIAN CONSULATE: Wait a minute.

Silvia Duran is then heard to speak in English to someone apparently sitting at her side. This conversation goes as follows:

"He said, wait. Do you speak Russian?"

"Yes."

"Why don't you speak to him then?"

"I don't know ..."

The person who was at the side of Silvia Duran and who admitted to speaking some Russian then gets on the line and speaks what is described as "terrible, hardly recognizable Russian." This person was later identified as Lee Harvey Oswald.

OSWALD: "Have they done anything?"

OBYEDKOV: "Yes, they say a request has been sent out,
but nothing has been received yet."

OSWALD: "And what . . ."

OBYEDKOV: (Hangs up)

Marina has testified that Oswald told her that he wanted to
got to Mexico because he thought he could get to Russia from there
by way of Cuba.

The Mexican Government immediately after the assassination
conducted a detailed interrogation of Silvia Duran. She stated that
Oswald's sole purpose in contacting the Cuban Embassy and the Russian
Embassy was to get a visa to go to Russia by way of Cuba. He told
her that the Russian Embassy in Washington had said it would take 3
to 4 months and he felt if he could go to Cuba he could wait there
until he got his Russian visa. She said she filled out an application
for him and that it was submitted to Cuba and in fact it had been
returned granting permission for Oswald to go to Cuba provided he
first had received the Russian part of the visa. The application and
the permission are apparently still in the Cuban Embassy and we are

attempting to get the Swiss Ambassador in Cuba to request the Cuban Government to supply the United States with such documents.

If it is established beyond doubt that such was the purpose of Oswald's visit it negates the suspicion of a conspiracy developed during the time of the Mexico visit. There is the problem, however,

little that we have ~~better~~ information on what Oswald did while in Mexico.

In fact there is a complete blank on what he did on Sunday, September 29, and there is little on other days except as recorded above.

Through security arrangements the Commission also has access to two telephone conversations between the President of Cuba and the Cuban Ambassador in Mexico City. These were long distance overseas calls and they are hard to understand. The calls took place after Silvia Duran was taken into custody and the President of Cuba wanted to know information concerning money which was alleged to have passed to Oswald at the Cuban Embassy. These calls could be interpreted as though the President knew money had passed and what he was interested in was whether Silvia Duran had made such statement to the Mexican

officials. On the other hand, the CIA official on the spot says that he interprets them as saying that the President thinks that the Mexican Government will try to get Silvia Duran to make this statement even though it is not true and has this happened?

The Commission should insist that the CIA and the other security agencies of Government listen to these tapes and give the Commission their judgment. The reason why this is so important is that Ambassador Mann who was the Ambassador to Mexico at the time of the assassination sent several despatches back to the State Department strongly indicating that it was his belief that the Cuban Government was involved in the assassination. He places great reliance on the telephone conversations. He also stated that the hotel at which Oswald stayed was a known meeting place for Cuban conspirators. Subsequent FBI reports negate the statement.

We have also attached hereto as an appendix a summary of every statement or rumor which deals in any way with a claim that a foreign conspiracy was involved. We have attempted to indicate by

an asterisk those which are so unsubstantial that they don't require further consideration. On the other hand, where the allegation is more substantial we have attempted to show why the Commission should disregard ~~them~~ it.

We have determined that the Cuban Consulate was replaced.

Someone might ask how Oswald would know about such replacement so

soon after the event. The CIA has informed us that the plan to

replace the Cuban Consulate had been made before Oswald reached

Mexico City and he might have picked up the knowledge at that time.

III. Cuban Involvement

The suspicion of Cuban involvement is based upon two factors, one, Oswald's identification with the Fair Play for Cuba, and two,

Oswald's trip to Mexico. From all of the information we have with respect to the Fair Play for Cuba, it looks as though it was pretty much of a one-man show and there was no direct or indirect contact with the Cuban Government.

The Mexican trip causes more difficulty. Through security arrangements we have seen written summaries of transcripts of certain conversations between the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico while Oswald was in Mexico as well as conversations between the President of Cuba and the Cuban Ambassador in Mexico, soon ~~xx~~ after the assassination.